This paper develops a theory of dynamic management strategies, which is subsequently applied to a group of remarkably dynamic, high-growth firms: gazelles. The theory emphasises the importance of firms adjusting strategies in response to changes in the external environment, and explains several key empirical findings using a novel British data set containing information on over 100 gazelles. These findings include (i) why Gibrat's Law of random firm growth processes does not generally hold, (ii) which strategy and environmental variables have a predictable influence on firm performance, and (iii) why routine application of 'best practice' strategies is unlikely to foster firm growth in a changing economic environment. In so doing, this paper contributes to the large literatures on small-firm growth and contingency theory, offering an attempt to build bridges between the two.
Introduction
What explains di¤erences in growth rates between …rms? There have been many attempts to answer this question since at least the time of Gibrat (1931) , who proposed in his famous 'law'that the widely observed positively skewed distribution of …rm sizes can be explained in terms of …rm growth rates being independent random variables. In this paper, we connect Gibrat's Law to the strategic management literature, particularly in the areas of small…rm growth and contingency theory, by making three contributions.
First, we advance a theoretical framework that emphasises the importance of dynamic, rather than static, management strategies. This is embedded in a joint model of …rm performance, management strategies, and the external environment. Here, we follow in the footsteps of the well-established SWOTview that …rms can enhance their performance by building and re-building a …t between internal Strengths and Weaknesses on the one hand and external Opportunities and Threats on the other hand. As is well-known from, e.g., studies about organizational change and learning, this …t-promoting strategy requires the need to adapt regularly -and, according to many scholars, quasicontinuously -to changing circumstances. This line of argument underscores the key importance of dynamic strategies [Porter (1991) ].
Second, we show how this theory can explain three empirical …ndings, using a novel British data set containing information on over 100 gazelles. These …ndings include (i) why Gibrat's Law of random …rm growth processes does not generally hold, (ii) which strategy and environmental variables have a predictable in ‡uence on …rm performance, and (iii) why routine application of 'best practice' strategies is unlikely to foster …rm growth in a changing economic environment. The latter …ndings in particular o¤er evidence that much of modern consultancy practice may well be counter-productive, as this is to a large extent based on benchmarking best practices, and spreading the latter through the large client community [Sorge and van Witteloostuijn (2004) ].
Third, we apply the theory to a group of remarkably dynamic high-growth …rms: gazelles [Birch (1987) ]. Despite their economic importance -re ‡ected in the observation by Jovanovic (2001) that in 1999 four US companies (Microsoft, Dell, MCI and Cisco Systems), all of which at the time were less than 20 years old, had a valuation equivalent to 13 per cent of US GDPrelatively little is known about the performance of this class of …rms. So our paper attempts to extend the knowledge base in this direction as well. This is particularly important given the common observation that passing the barrier to growth is anything but easy, as many small …rms either remain small or fail altogether [Storey (1994) ].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background, using contingency theory as our stepping stone. By way of benchmark, we develop a series of hypotheses as to the expected performance impact of a number of oft-studied management strategies. Subsequently, Section 3 contains the theory development in our context of high-growth …rms. We derive here the implications of …rms adopting dynamic management strategies instead of static management strategies, and outline the central hypotheses of the paper. Section 4 describes the data set, summarising some characteristics of the sample, and explaining the variables used to measure the external environment, management strategies, and …rm performance. Section 5 discusses the statistical framework underpinning the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents our results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Benchmark hypotheses
Previous research has distinguished di¤erent (types of) management strategies from each other. Key examples are Miles and Snow's (1978) and Porter's (1980) typologies of generic strategies or strategic pro…les [Segev (1989) ]. Apart from such generic strategies, many speci…c strategies have been studied from di¤erent functional perspectives. Four of such functional strategies in particular have been widely analysed: human resource management (HRM) [Huselid (1995) ; Storey (2003) ], innovation and technology [Itami and Numagami (1992) ; Audretsch (1995) ], administration and governance [Naman and Slevin (1993) ; Daily et al. (2002] and marketing and sales [Slater and Olson (2001) ; Matsuno et al. (2002) ]. Collectively, we refer to these below as 'functional'or 'speci…c strategies'. These strategies, which characterise the way a business is organised and strategies are executed, are complemented by generic strategies, which re ‡ect the competitive positioning decisions the …rm makes. As we will explain below, our data relate to aspects of corporate strategy only, and not of competitive strategy. Of course, there is a huge literature about competitive strategies as well, which particularly relates to Porterian issues of cost leadership and product di¤erentiation (the 'How to Compete' rather than the 'Where to Compete' dimension). Note however that our four speci…c strategies capture key aspects of any competitive strategy. As a shortcut, we use the management strategy label if we refer to generic and speci…c strategies together.
Apart from many bivariate strategy-performance studies, there is a large multivariate …t literature. For example, Heijltjes and van Witteloostuijn (2003) study HRM, manufacturing and competitive strategies, and their joint impact upon organisational performance under di¤erent environmental circumstances. Basically, the di¤erent bivariate and multivariate …t studies represent di¤erent pieces of the larger contingency puzzle [Venkatraman (1989) ], which originates in the classic contributions of such scholars as Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in the 1960s. The key argument is that the whole set of internal and external drivers of organisational performance must work together to produce …t. It is possible to take a static view of …t, and hence of the associated generic and speci…c strategies. This is in the sense that a management consultancy might suggest a set of 'best practice' strategies to a …rm which serve as 'rules of thumb' that the …rm can adopt in good and bad times. In an empirical context, this 'static' …t concept has been studied with cross-section designs.
By way of benchmark, we formulate eight hypotheses relating to a series of management strategies, as well as the external environment. Indeed, these are benchmark hypotheses for at least two reasons. First, extant evidence is mixed, at best, for the majority of the variables we take on board here. More often than not, we could refer to studies reporting negative, positive, non-linear or non-signi…cant e¤ects of the variable at hand. Second, this paper focuses on a very speci…c type of …rm: gazelles. To the best of our knowledge, studies into gazelles are very scarce. Taken together, this implies that our study explores the ambiguous performance impact of a wide set of management strategy and external environment variables in a novel setting. This is, at the same time, this study's strength and weakness. We therefore decided for a two-step approach. First, given the huge literature on each of our management strategies and the external environment variables, we here only brie ‡y introduce our benchmark hypotheses with references related to our empirical measures (see below). Second, in the discussion of our …ndings, we try to move beyond those benchmark hypotheses in a tailor-made way, linking our …ndings to the speci…c case of gazelles. In so doing, we hope to contribute to our understanding of this very special type of organisations.
Corporate strategy relates to the 'Where to Compete' issue. We have data on the busines-to-business, international focus and product diversi…ca-tion pro…le of each …rm's corporate strategy. Evidence on what works and what does not in this area, is mixed. This is clear, for instance, from the geographical and product diversi…cation literature [for an early example, e.g., see Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) ]. Just as a benchmark, therefore, we take H1: (a) a business-to-business posture, (b) an international focus and (c) product diversi…cation are positively associated with organisational performance.
In the human resource management literature, there is ample evidence that a committed investment in employees tends to payo¤ well [Huselid (1995) ; Pfe¤er (1998) ]. For example, workforce participation and training are argued to be positivly related to the employees' creativity, motivation and productivity [Inchniowski et al. (1997) ; Amabile and Conti (1999) ]. To embed such HRM policies in the organisation's strategy, high-level responsibilities must be in place, integrating HRM in the organisation's overall strategy [Schuler (1992) ]. This gives H2: (a) workforce participation, (b) workforce training and (c) having a HRM director at the board level are positively associated with organisational performance.
In this paper, the innovation and technology strategy is focused on the development and launch of new products and services. By and large, the literature suggests that such an R&D orientation is positively associated with organisational performance [Henderson (1993) ; Robson and Bennett (2002) ]. As with HRM, new product policies are more likely to be linked well with the organisation's overall strategy if high-level responsibilities are in place. This suggests H3: (a) new products or services, (b) new product development, and (c) having an R&D director at the board level are positively associated with organisational performance.
The strategy of administration and governance is, to a large extent, related to issues of ownership. Following agency theory logic, a key argument is that committed and concentrated ownership with a focus on the long run is positively correlated with organisational performance [James (1999) ]. For instance, familiy businesses are found to outperform their non-family counterparts [Anderson and Reeb (2003) ]. From this, we derive H4: (a) being a single corporate entity, (b) directors' ownership and (c) institutional ownership are positively associated with organisational performance.
Marketing and sales strategies come in many forms and shapes [Conant et al. (1990) ]. We have measures of three of them. Indeed, there is evidence that the performance e¤ects of using customer surveys, taking customer complaints seriously and having a marketing department are positive [Rust et al. (2002); Brooksbank et al. (2003] . So, we formulate H5: (a) using customer surveys, (b) taking customer complaints seriously and (c) having a marketing department are positively associated with organisational performance.
Apart from the above management strategies, drawing upon prior work and given the available data (see below), we characterise the external environment in three dimensions: market attractiveness [Davidsson et al. (2002) ], bargaining power [Nobeoka et al. (2002) ], and market competitiveness [Bruderl and Preisendorfer (2000) ]. Here, our set of three hypotheses is based on straightforward IO-inspired Porterian logic. Market attractiveness is proxied 6 with measures of sales risk and past demand growth. If sales are volatile, on the one hand, this will harm organisational performance. On the other hand, past demand growth signals a high pro…t potential. Thus, we propose H6: (a) sales risk is negatively and (b) past demand growth positively associated with organisational performance.
Bargaining power is one of Porter's (1980) well-known …ve forces of competition. Bargaining power increases with the number of customers, but decreases with sales concentration. This gives H7: (a) the number of customers is positively and (b) sales concentration is negatively associated with organisational performance.
Market competiveness depends upon a wide variety of issues, as is well known from the literatures in IO and strategy [Tirole (1988) ]. Two key market structure features that have been heavily studied, are the number of competitors and market concentration [van Witteloostuijn and Boone (2005) ], the …rst being positively and the second negatively associated with the intensity of competition. Hence, IO logic provides H8: (a) The number of competitors is negatively and (b) market share concentration is positively associated with organisational performance.
Theory development
Basically, the above logic is static. In contrast, we argue that the key to understanding …rm growth in general -and that of dynamic …rms like gazelles in particular -necessitates an analysis of dynamic management strategies. This argument is nicely in line with many modern perspectives on strategy, such as those of the resource-based view of the …rm and the dynamic capability explanation of above-normal performance [Wernerfelt (1984) ; Teece et al. (1997); and Pennings et al. (1998)] . Recently, along these lines, Zajac et al. (2000) proposed a dynamic modelling approach to the strategic …t issue, emphasising the need for longitudinal research in the contingency tradition.
Ideally, dynamic management strategies vary actively and deliberately over time, as …rms respond intelligently to changes in the external environment. We adopt a simple model of a dynamic management strategy framework that links together di¤erent management strategies, the external environment, and organisational performance. Basically, we assume that each generic or speci…c strategy individually, and our four speci…c strategies and single generic strategies collectively (see above), positively in ‡uence performance provided that all elements …t nicely together. Although this setup is not explicitly intertemporal, it captures the notion that as the external environment evolves so too should the …rm's strategies. So, we explicitly take a dynamic and multi-dimensional view of the …t issue. As we now show formally, this well-established perspective has implications for …rm growth that give rise to several testable hypotheses. As our starting point, we take the well-known Law of Gibrat.
Gibrat's 'Law' states that the rate of growth of a …rm in one period is independent of the …rm's size, and so has no in ‡uence on the …rm's growth in subsequent periods. Thus if we measure …rm size by (for example) turnover, which we denote at time t by T t , then Gibrat's Law states that ln T t is random and independent of ln T t 8 , where is the …rst di¤erence operator, 'ln'denotes the natural logarithm, and = 1; 2; : : : . In contrast, the strategic management literature explicitly assumes that …rm growth is non-random, with some …rms performing consistently better than others, at least in part because they adopt more appropriate strategies given the environmental context in which they are applied. So, Gibrat's Law o¤ers a nice benchmark against which to test strategic management's claim that strategy matters [McGahan and Porter (2003) ].
It is now well established that Gibrat's Law is inconsistent with independent empirical evidence. Thus, in his review of 'Gibrat's Legacy', Sutton (1997) concluded that half a century of testing has revealed several statistical regularities that are incompatible with …rm growth being a purely random process. For example, Singh and Whittington (1968) for the UK and Wagner (1992) for West Germany both reported evidence of systematic patterns in …rm growth over time. Both sets of authors found that those …rms growing faster in one period of time were likelier than others to have above-average growth rates in subsequent periods too. More recently, Boone et al. (2002 Boone et al. ( , 2004 reported that growth patterns depend heavily on the competitive po-sition of the strategic group of …rms involved, using a longitudinal study of Dutch daily newspapers, where di¤erent strategic groups reveal di¤erent growth patterns.
The empirical failure of Gibrat's Law suggests the value and importance of strategic management research that seeks to understand how strategy variables systematically a¤ect aspects of …rm performance, including their growth rates. However, the strategic management discipline still lacks entirely satisfactory answers to the long-standing question about why Gibrat's Law fails. In this paper, we argue that the use of dynamic management strategies -de…ned as a set of …rm strategies that are managed actively in response to an ever-changing external environment -can provide the requisite explanation. Our argument draws on existing research on the linkages between …rm performance and functional strategies, particularly in the contingency tradition. Above, we brie ‡y discussed four of them: human resource management, innovation and technology, administration and governance, and marketing and sales strategies. For the sake of convenience, we refer to an overall management strategies category, which captures competitive, corporate and functional --or generic and speci…c -strategies as a set. Moreover, we distinguish static from dynamic management strategies. A set of static management strategies remains constant from period t to period t + , whereas their dynamic counterparts change from period t to t + . This relates to the well-established literature on organisational inertia or momentum, vis-à-vis organisational ‡exibility or adaptation [see, e.g., Amburgey and Miner (1992) and Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) ].
In order to develop hypotheses as to Gibrat's Law and its breakdown, we develop a formal …rm growth model that includes external environment and management strategy variables. Suppose that there are J management strategies in total, comprising both generic and speci…c strategies (in our empirical application, J = 5). Let S jt denote the cardinal realisation of strategy j at time t (with S jt > 0 8j; t), and let e t denote the impact of the external environment on …rm turnover at t. Re ‡ecting the real-world persistence of environmental phenomena, suppose e t = e t 1 + t , where
2 ) is an identically and independently distributed unforecastable 9 shock, with mean zero and variance 2 . Re ‡ecting the unforecastable nature of t , the covariance between t and strategy variables at any t is zero: i.e., cov( t ; S jt ) = 0 ; 8j; t. Now suppose that a …rm's (sales) turnover (which will serve as a measure of performance) is related in a Cobb-Douglas fashion to the strategies, together with a multiplicative impact from the environment:
where the j parameters describe the marginal impact of each strategy on turnover, which is zero if the relevant j is zero, and positive otherwise. Taking logs of Equation (1), gives
Next, lag Equation (2) one period, and subtract from (2) to obtain
The …nal step is to say something about …rms'choices of strategies, which are after all purposively chosen, not exogenously given. For simplicity, suppose that we can characterise two types of …rm. One type adopts a static set of management strategies, …xing its vector of strategies at some time, terms in Equation (3) remain -in contradiction to Gibrat's Law. Hypothesis 9 then follows immediately as H9: Gibrat's Law does not hold if …rms implement dynamic management strategies, but it does hold if …rms implement static management strategies.
H9 implies that dynamic management strategies can in principle explain the widely documented empirical breakdowns in Gibrat's Law. This insight has not been widely appreciated to date, especially (but not exclusively) by the economics profession [Sutton (1997) ]. From a strategic management perspective, H9 implies that strategic change destroys Gibrat's Law.
From the above, we derive two further observations. The …rst observation follows directly from inspection of Equations (2) and (3): management strategy and external environment variables have a predictable in ‡uence upon organisational performance. This is re ‡ected in H1 to H8 above. We note that line of argument is robust to extensions of the model that allow for interactions between the management strategy and external environment variables, which is often referred to as an issue of external '…t'. For example, the concept of external '…t'becomes important if Equation (1) is generalised to become
It should also be clear from di¤erentiation of Equation (1) with respect to each S j that interdependence between the di¤erent management strategies is already embodied in this speci…cation. That is, the marginal impact of each strategy is dependent on all of the other strategies, unless the other j coe¢ cients equal zero. There is an additional implication of Equation (3). Consider two periods in which the environment is di¤erent. Then even if …rms adopt static management strategies, Equation (3) implies that di¤er-ences in …rm growth rates will also di¤er in general. This produces a second observation: A su¢ cient condition for di¤erent mean …rm growth rates in di¤erent time periods is di¤erent environmental circumstances. Our …nal hypothesis is motivated by a thought-experiment of the follow-11 ing kind. It is sometimes suggested, usually in the popular management press and in the world of consultancies [Sorge and van Witteloostuijn (2004) ], that there often exist simple 'best practice'strategies that …rms can adopt to enhance their performance. Identify such strategies with S j0 , de…ned above. Then it can be shown 2 that H10: Adoption of static management strategies will not increase a …rm's long-run growth rate.
Note that our tests of H9 and H10 will be exploratory only, as is explained below in greater detail, because of the one-shot nature of our measurement of strategy variables.
The data
Data were collected in three steps over real time. The …rst step at time t was to identify the population of non-subsidiary, medium-sized and UK-owned companies, and to identify those that had enjoyed rapid sales growth during the previous four-year period, i.e., between t and t 4. The second step was to conduct, in year t, a telephone interview with the Chairmen / Chief Executives of these companies. The third step was to track the changes in these companies until t + 5.
Step One. The data were taken from the ICC / One Source database. The sample was drawn in late 1995. The purpose was to examine the factors in ‡uencing the performance of UK 'Middle Market'companies. These were de…ned as limited companies that were not subsidiaries and which, in their most recent …nancial year, had sales of between £ 5 million and £ 100 million. To measure …rm growth, all companies in the sample were also required to have at least four previous years of …nancial records. The ICC / One Source database identi…ed 7,203 companies that satis…ed these criteria. These companies were then ranked in terms of compound annual sales change over the prior four years. Those companies whose annual sales growth exceeded 30 per cent per annum were de…ned to be the group of interest. They consti-tuted 9.8 per cent of the Middle Market population, and are referred to as 'Ten Percenters'. In total, 708 were identi…ed. The ICC / One Source database includes primarily …nancial data in the form of pro…t and loss accounts, and balance sheets, together with details on directors and share ownership. To obtain additional information about …rms'strategies, direct contact was made with a random sample of these …rms.
Step Two. Interviews were conducted in November 1996 to obtain an understanding of a wide array of management strategies for a sample of these …rms. These interviews took place with 156 out of the 708 …rms deemed to be eligible, a crude response rate of 22 per cent.
3 The telephone interview with, normally, the Chairman/ Chief Executive focused on their views of the factors in ‡uencing sales growth in the prior four years, management strategies, and broader environmental conditions.
Step Three. The companies were then tracked until 2001, using the Fame database. Like ICC/One Source, Fame utilises data submitted to Companies House. The status of the company in 2001 was assessed so that a distinction could be made between those companies that survived and those that did not. A second distinction was made, amongst the survivors, between those that continued to be independent and those that were acquired. Financial data for survivors were also available up to 2001. Hence, …ve years of performance data were available following the initial identi…cation of the …rm in 1996. Of the 156 potential cases, 121 were used in this analysis. Sample attrition occurred because, with the additional information, 12 cases were now deemed to be ineligible. growth analysis [Sutton (1997) ]. That is, …rms that survive tend to have higher growth rates on average, so estimates of …rm growth equations need to take account explicitly of possible sample selection bias.
We now de…ne …rms'observed status in 2001. First, denote …rm i's sales turnover in 2001 by T i if it survived until then. Status can then take one of …ve values for …rm i:
Henceforth, we refer (merely for brevity) to status groups 1, 2 and 3 as 'small', 'medium'and 'large', respectively. Not too much should be read into these appellations as a size discriminator. Nor can the above status schema be regarded as an ordering, given the presence of group 4. The penultimate row of Table 3 below will present data on the frequencies for each status group. Our other measure of performance is …rms'turnover growth rate over 1992-1996 and 1996-2001 . These rates are calculated using the whole array of turnover values for each …rm, a standard practice in strategic management research about organisational growth.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] The …rst and second parts of Table 1 suggest empirical counterparts to the …ve management strategies and the three external environment dimensions, respectively. We measured each management strategy with three item scores, and each external environment variable with two questionnaire items (see Table 1 ). The last part of Table 1 discusses control variables, which are included to increase the reliability of estimates of the key relationships. The key controls are broad industrial type (i.e., manufacturing or services), …rm age and size, geographical location, and current return on capital and sales turnover.
Finally, we framed the sample deliberately to minimise three sources of 14 variation that could reduce the precision of our empirical estimates: those relating to size, ownership and legal form. First, by focusing on mediumsized …rms, we restrict the range of variation of performance with respect to …rm size. Second, it is known that …rm performance is also in ‡uenced by ownership [Disney et al. (2003) ] with, in some instances, enterprises that are part of a larger group outperforming others through their access to economies of scale and scope. Restricting the sample to exclude …rms that are subsidiaries minimises this source of variation. Third, because there is evidence that limited liability status is powerfully associated with …rm growth [Harho¤ et al. (1998) ], we include only limited companies in the sample. In 1996, the …rms in the database qualify as 'gazelles', having experienced a mean annual sales growth rate between 1992 and 1996 of 36.0 per cent, with a standard deviation of 42.3 per cent. Strikingly, mean annual sales growth slowed dramatically between 1996 and 2001, with mean annual growth rates of only 8.0 per cent and a standard deviation of 29.4 per cent. Thus the gazelle-like growth behaviour of …rms in this sample appears to be fragile, having failed to persist over a decade. Clearly, the reason for this cannot be found in a business cycle downturn, as the period involved perfectly matches with the booming Internet era of the late 1990s.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] Summary descriptive statistics on growth rates and on the strategy, environment, performance and control variables we actually include in our analyses (see below) appear in Table 2 . Table 2 reveals that our sample is not entirely representative, which we should bear in mind whilst interpreting our results. In particular, our gazelles operate primarily in business-to-business markets in services industries, with high reliance on a single product and high managerial ownership, and with an emphasis on new product development. 
Modelling …rm status and growth
We model status z i in terms of a vector of …rm-speci…c characteristics, v i , observed in 1996. This vector includes the management strategy, external environment and control variables described in the previous section. To explain status outcomes in 2001 in terms of v i , we use the multinomial logit model
where the j are vectors of coe¢ cients for each status group j. Following conventional practice, we identify the parameters of this model by imposing the normalisation 0 = 0. For reasons of interpretability, it is important to be clear what the elements of each vector mean. The 'k'th element of vector j (for j > 0), i.e., jk , measures the impact of the 'k'th independent variable, v ik , on the log-odds ratio of observing a …rm in status group j relative to being liquidated. Thus a positive coe¢ cient indicates the extent to which the corresponding variable increases the odds of observing a …rm in status group j in 2001 rather than in liquidation.
Estimates of the j coe¢ cients are of interest for two reasons. The …rst is that they can help test H1 to H8. That is, if the management strategy and external environment elements of v i are found to signi…cantly a¤ect …rm status in the predicted direction, then the associated hypothesis will receive support. The second reason for the interest in status outcomes is that they might also in ‡uence …rms' average annual growth rates. For instance, a growth model could be estimated using data on all …rms (for which z i takes any value in Equation (4)), or just the sub-sample of independent survivors, for which 1 z i 3. If survivors have di¤erent growth rates than nonsurvivors (i.e., liquidated or acquired …rms), then any analysis of growth needs to take account of this in order to avoid potential bias. To this end, we estimate the following sample-selectivity corrected growth model.
Let g i denote the annual growth rate of …rm i's sales turnover between 16 1996 and 2001. 6 De…ne T as the total sample of …rms for which g i is observable in the 1996-2001 period (i.e., for which at least two years of sales turnover data are available). De…ne S T as the sub-sample of …rms for which g i is observed and which were still trading independently in 2001. Let x i denote a vector of …rm characteristics observed in 1996 that might a¤ect subsequent growth g i , where x i 6 = v i . 7 The predicted probability that …rm i survives to 2001 given its observable characteristics in 1996 iŝ
; where
and where and are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal distribution. Then a sample-selectivity corrected growth model is
where is a vector of coe¢ cients, and is a scalar, all to be estimated. An appropriate strategy is to use the two-step maximum likelihood and leastsquares estimator of Lee (1983) -which is known to be a consistent estimator. An interesting special case of Equation (6) occurs if the null hypothesis H 0 : = 0 cannot be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels. Then it is admissible to estimate a growth equation for all …rms, not just survivors:
which can be estimated as a conventional regression.
6 Unlike pro…tability, which took negative values for several …rms in 1996 and 2001, turnover is always non-zero. So the concept of a growth rate is always well de…ned.
7 In fact, it is possible to allow x i = v i , but then identi…cation of the selectivitycorrected growth equation below depends entirely on assumptions of normal disturbances and correct functional speci…cations -thin reeds indeed on which to base identi…cation [Johnson and DiNardo (1997) ].
How can these methods be used to test hypotheses H1 through H10? First, consider again H1 to H8. If estimation of either Equation (6) or (7) …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects from any of the management strategy or external environment components of the vector of explanatory variables x, then this provides support to the associated hypothwees, taking growth as a measure of …rm performance and provided that the estimated coe¢ cient has the hypothesized sign.
To test H9, let g i measure growth over 1996-2001 as before, and de…ne g i; 1 as average growth of …rm i over 1992-96. We now generalise Equation (6) (analogously (7)) in two ways:
where ; 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; 2+J are coe¢ cients, and S ij is management strategy variable j (of a total of J) embodied in x i , i.e., fS i g J j=1
x i , 8i. Equation (8) tests Gibrat's Law directly. If we are unable to reject the hypothesis that = 0, then Gibrat's Law receives support: …rm growth rates are independent. But this speci…cation does not explicitly allow for …rms to adjust their strategies in response to growth, and so break Gibrat's Law. That possibility appears in Equation (9), which includes a set of interactions between previous growth and new strategies, g i; 1 S ij , which map on to subsequent growth with coe¢ cients f 2+j g J j=1 . That is, the interaction terms measure the extent to which strategies covary in response to previous outcomes. Thus H9 implies that = 0 in Equation (8), while at least some of the f 2+j g J j=1 coe¢ cients in Equation (9) are statistically signi…cant, indicating the breakage of Gibrat's Law as a consequence of implementing dynamic management strategies.
To test H10, slightly di¤erent versions of Equations (6) and (7) must be estimated. Now let g i denote the average growth rate over 1992-96, and let x i denote a vector of explanatory variables observed at 1996 that help determine growth after 1996. Clearly, the strategies and conditions applying in 1996 cannot have directly caused any …rm growth observed over 1992-96, while using data from 1996 captures the notion of a set of inappropriate static strategies being chosen by a …rm. If so, H10 implies that there should be no signi…cant e¤ect from x i on g i , i.e., H10 implies that an F-test should be unable to reject the hypothesis that = 0.
Results
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we only report the results for those control variables (Tables 3 to 6 ) and interaction variables (Table 5 only) that turned out to be signi…cant at least once in our series of analyses (complete results are available upon request). So, the control and interaction variables that are not associated with any reported result were never signi…cant. This can also be construed as a result in its own right, as it indicates which variables proved to be irrelevant throughout our series of analyses. We …rst estimated the status model (5). The results are collected in Table 3 . Before turning to the interpretation, we note the impressive statistical performance of the multinomial logit model. The model is highly signi…cant according to a standard likelihood ratio test, emphatically rejecting the null hypothesis that the parameters are jointly zero. And, the …t is good. This is indicated not just by the pseudo-R 2 of 0.422, but also by the similarity of the vectors of actual and …tted numbers in each status group (see the bottom two rows of the table). This is especially satisfying, as even well-speci…ed multinomial logit models often fail to predict any cases in some groups (Greene, 2003 : E19-7).
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
In the area of corporate strategy, the results are mixed. On the one hand, as far as the …rm's product portfolio is concerned, having a single dominant product or service in 1996 increases the log-odds of being a large …rm in 2001. This is in contrast with H1c. So, a product 'core business' strat-egy, by 'sticking close to the knitting', pays o¤ nicely, whereas a product diversi…cation-type of policy tends to be counter-productive. On the other hand, trading in an international market in 1996 reduced the log odds of being a small …rm (or acquired) …ve years later. This …nding is in contrast with H1b. This implies that a geographical diversi…cation strategy, perhaps by searching for foreign markets for the dominant product, reduces the small and medium-sized gazelles'likelihood of survival. The third corporate strategy coe¢ cient -a business-to-business posture -is not signi…cant. Hence, H1a is not supported. Strikingly, administration and governance, and HRM Strategies dropped out altogether in the end-period status analyses. That is, none of the HRM or administration and governance strategy variables is associated with signi…cant estimates. So, we …nd no support whatsoever for H2 and H4. The latter …nding con…rms Dalton et al.'s (1998) conclusion that board features are not consistently linked to …rm (…nancial) performance. The impact of the innovation and technology Strategy variables on subsequent survival are generally not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, with one exception. Strikingly, gazelles that developed new products for introduction to the market after 1996 were signi…cantly more likely to end up liquidated in 2001 than they were to survive independently, which is contrary to what we predicted in H3b. This …nding might re ‡ect the risk of new product development. Note that the signi…cantly negative acquisition …nding might be a signal of success: perhaps, gazelles emphasising new product development successfully, are an attractive acquisition target. Finally, two marketing and sales strategy variables are signi…cant determinants of subsequent …rm status. Companies that relied on customer complaints in 1996 to evaluate the quality of their product or service were signi…cantly less likely to survive as a small or large …rm in 2001, or to be acquired. (The results were similar for becoming medium-sized, but were not signi…cant.) This runs against H5b. Firms that had marketing or sales departments in 1996 were signi…cantly more likely to be large or acquired in 2001 than they were to be liquidated, which provides evidence for H5c. The estimate for the third marketing and sales variable -use of customer surveys -fails to reach signi…cance. Hence, H5a is not supported.
As far as external environment variables are concerned, only three items are associated with at least one signi…cant estimate. For one, both bargaining power items have an impact. Having a large customer base (of over 1000 customers) in 1996, and having witnessed a growing concentration of sales to a few customers just prior to that time, both signi…cantly increase the log-odds of a …rm being a small survivor in 2001 relative to being liquidated, and the log-odds of liquidation relative to being acquired. The latter …nding is in contrast with H7b, which might re ‡ect the unattractiveness of acquiring …rms with complex selling operations. The customer base result is in support of H7a. Interestingly, we detected no signi…cant e¤ects of customer base or customer concentration on promoting survival at a larger scale. And …rms with large turnovers in 1996 (one of the control variables) were signi…cantly more likely to have been liquidated by 2001 than to have survived with high turnover. This might re ‡ect 'regression to the mean'in …rm size, or creative destruction [Greve (1999) ]. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, …rms with growing customer demand in 1996 were signi…cantly less likely to become large or taken over by 2001, which relates to the market attractiveness dimension. This runs against H6b. This might be because the greatest demand growth was concentrated among the smallest …rms, which do not grow quite fast enough to ultimately shift size group. Alternatively, …rms facing growing demand might over-stretch themselves or become victims of a turbulent trading environment -ending up in liquidation in either case. The other market attractiveness variable's coe¢ cient (sales risk) is insigni…cant. Hence, H6a is not supported. Finally, estimates for both market competitiveness variables never reach signi…cance. Apparently, the gazelles'competitive environment in 1996 does not impact upon their status in 2001. H8 receives no support whatsoever.
Finally, a series of control varables has a signi…cant impact. First, industrial sector in 1996 played a limited role. Service sector …rms are signi…cantly more likely to become liquidated than to become or remain small …rms by 2001, though at higher turnover levels there are no strong e¤ects. Being in manufacturing reduced the log odds of being acquired by 2001, which might re ‡ect the challenge of taking on large specialised enterprises with heavy physical capital liabilities. Also, exit might be more likely in manufacturing re ‡ecting its continuing decline in Great Britain. Firms founded before 1939 were signi…cantly more likely to end up as small independent survivors in 2001 than to go into liquidation, but they were also signi…cantly more likely to go into liquidation than to grow into medium-sized enterprises or to be acquired. Firms with high returns to capital in 1996 were signi…cantly more likely to have been acquired than to have been liquidated by 2001 -but were signi…cantly more likely to have been liquidated than become small …rms. And a …rm located in the English Midlands and East Anglia had higher log-odds of surviving with low turnover, all else equal, than being liquidated. Finally, having a large workforce in 1996 is predictably associated with survival in 2001, especially at higher turnover levels.
Our interpretation of Table 3 , thus far, has been across the rows, but comparing the columns provides di¤erent insights. Four possible status outcomes are identi…ed, with the columns identifying the characteristics that distinguish these outcomes in comparison with the base case of liquidation. For example, the …rst column (z = 1) shows the characteristics of …rms most likely to survive, but be small. These are seen to be …rms where the growth rates slow sharply after 1996. Such …rms are unlikely to be in the service sector, and likely to be older, founded before 1939, and located in the Midlands and East Anglia. They tend to be larger employers, but with low sales, implying low productivity.
However, it is the strategy of such …rms that is interesting since they tend to be strongly dependent upon international markets, have many customers, and operate in markets where sales concentration was recognised as rising sharply in 1996. Their response to these threats, even in 1996, would seem to have been counterintuitive. For example, they were very unlikely to use customer complaints as a measure of the quality of their product / service, they were unlikely to have a marketing department, and they were very unlikely to be developing a new product. Not surprisingly, their return on capital is low. In short, these …rms exhibit many of the characteristics of a 'trundler'-de…ned as a slow-growing but (just) surviving company, even though many of these characteristics were observed after a period of very rapid growth. In this sense, these …rms may have reverted to 'type'after an unusual period of high growth.
The interesting contrast is with the …rms in the third column (z = 3). This compares the …rms that not only survived but which also were large in 2001. These can be considered as surviving …rms that continued to grow rapidly, but were not acquired. These are arguably the 'true'gazelles. Perhaps surprisingly, the third column shows that the gazelles do not seem to have radically di¤erent strategies from that of the 'trundlers'. They tend to have larger workforces but lower sales, and they are also unlikely to be developing new products or to be using customer complaints as a measure of quality. Where they di¤er from 'trundlers'is in being more likely to have a marketing department, in having prior to 1996 slower demand growth, and in having a main product that is a major contributor to sales. It should be noted that dependency upon international markets is not a characteristic of gazelles in this sample.
The …nal column (z = 4) shows the company characteristics associated with being acquired, relative to being liquidated. Some of these …ndings are as one might have expected. Acquisition is more likely to have occurred where the company is young, rather than old, and less likely when it is in manufacturing, rather than services. The presence of a marketing department also has a positive impact. Perhaps more surprising is that these acquired …rms are those that are less likely to use customer complaints as a measure of quality, or to sell heavily in international markets, or to be developing a new product. They also have a smaller customer base, on average. Our interpretation of these mixed …ndings for the acquired group re ‡ects the mixture of motivations for the acquisition of such businesses. In some instances, it may re ‡ect a wish to negate the in ‡uence of a potentially powerful competitor; in others, it may be to acquire some element of a poorly performing enterprise. Pre-acquisition performance is therefore likely to re ‡ect this variety.
Finally, it is interesting to infer some characteristics of companies that are liquidated in comparison with those that survive or are acquired. It is clear that the non-survivors are smaller in terms of employment, but apparently more likely to be selling in international markets, more likely to be developing a new product, and more likely to be using customer complaints as a measure of quality. None of the latter characteristics are normally associated with poor performance.
Next, we estimated the sales turnover growth model (6), using data from 1996-2001, for the sample of surviving independent …rms only. The coe¢ cient on the sample selectivity term was found to be insigni…cant:^ = 0:062, with an absolute t-ratio of 0:828 [p = 0:417].
9 Thus the average turnover growth rates of …rms that survived independently for the …ve years following 1996 are not signi…cantly di¤erent from those of …rms that did not. For the most part, the 'survivors only' sample and the broader sample of all …rms also had similar determinants.
The …nding of insigni…cant sample selectivity allowed us to utilise the complete sample of all …rms, i.e., to estimate Equation (7). A general-tospeci…c estimation strategy yielded the parsimonious growth equation reported in Table 4 . This is statistically signi…cant and shows a reasonable goodness-of-…t -especially when compared with previous estimates of …rm employment growth equations [see, e.g., Westhead and Cowling (1995) ]. Table 4 presents, for the set of statistically signi…cant variables, the estimated coe¢ cients, t-ratios, and standardised coe¢ cients.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
What is striking about Table 4 is the relatively small number of statistically signi…cant determinants of growth, compared with the large number included at the outset of the general-to-speci…c modelling exercise. The most notable insigni…cant variables were as follows. First, average annual growth rates in the …ve years prior to 1996 [p=0.795: see In short, past success or scale is no guide to future success. Second, gazelles 9 A very similar result was obtained when survivors were pooled at the …rst stage: = 0:069, jtj = 0:758, and p = 0:430. Standard errors here are based on the selectivitycorrected covariance matrix described by Lee (1983) .
10 Standardised coe¢ cients are estimated after centring all variables around their mean and then dividing them by their standard deviation. They permit the relative economic signi…cance of a variable to be evaluated. that continue to grow are insensitive both to the number of competitors [p=0.492], and to new product development [p=0.827]. Third, it makes no di¤erence to subsequent growth whether the …rm's customers are households or other …rms [p=0.495]. Fourth, subsequent growth is observed in …rms in all industrial sectors, and whether or not they operate in national or international markets. Finally, workforce training, share ownership and directorship structure, being a single enterprise rather than part of a group, having a sales or marketing department, regional location, and age, were also insigni…cant determinants of future growth [p 0:15 in all cases]. In all, H1b, H1c, H2b, H2c, H3a, H3c, H5b, H5c, H6b, H7 and H8 receive no support.
Three of the …ve groups of management strategies play a signi…cant role in explaining company growth, though. In all areas except for administration and governance, only one item turned out to be signi…cant in each group: high-growth …rms tend to avoid issuing shares to workers (HRM strategy), to avoid developing new products or services (innovation and technology strategy), to conduct market research in the form of customer surveys (marketing and sales strategy), and to sell to other companies rather than to customers directly (corporate strategy). In contrast, all three administration and governance items are signi…cant: fast-growing …rms are also more likely to be part of a group than a single corporate body, and are less likely to issue shares to directors or outside investors. So, rather strikingly, we …nd signi…cant evidence against H2a, H3b and H4. Only H1a and H5a receive support.
As far as the external environment estimates are concerned, only one item produces a signi…cant coe¢ cient: the sales risk item of the market attractiveness dimension is positively associated with annual sales turnover growth in 1996-2001. This goes against H1a. Apparently, fast-growing …rms experience greater variation in sales turnover. The latter …nding is consistent with there being a risk-return trade-o¤: …rms only take above-average risks if they anticipate above-average payo¤s. Apart from that, the external environment is not producing any signi…cant in ‡uence on sales turnover growth. Apparently, management strategy is a much more important driver of the gazelles' growth performance than the external environment.
Two control variables are associated with signi…cant coe¢ cient estimates.
First, high-growth …rms are predominantly based outside the manufacturing sector. Second, they are primarily located outside the South West of England and Wales.
As well as these all being statistically signi…cant in ‡uences, some factors are also fairly substantial in economic terms. According to the column of standardised coe¢ cients, the most substantial negative in ‡uences on subsequent growth are (a) starting a workforce share ownership scheme, followed by (b) being located in the South West or Wales, and (c) issuing shares to directors. This suggests that location is important for sustaining high-growth gazelle behaviour, as is the retention of control rights by the owner. The latter …nding contrasts with some 'classic'warnings in the literature that future entrepreneurial growth can be jeopardised by egocentric entrepreneurs retaining control instead of 'handing over the reins'of the business to others [Morris et al. (1997) ]. In contrast, the standardised coe¢ cient for sales risk is relatively small, suggesting that although the risk-return trade-o¤ is present, it is not quantitatively very important.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] Next, we provide an exploratory test of Hypothesis 9 about Gibrat's Law by estimating Equations (8) and (9). Here, we estimate two models: Model 1 includes static management strategies (main e¤ects) only, while Model 2 adds dynamic management strategies (interaction e¤ects). The results are collected in Table 5 (recall that only the signi…cant interaction e¤ects are reported). Model 1's results indicate that, without controlling for dynamic management strategies, the average growth rate over the …ve years prior to 1996 (called 'lagged growth') is insigni…cant -implying that Gibrat's Law cannot be rejected. In contrast, Model 2's …ndings show that lagged growth becomes statistically signi…cant when interacted with shares held by the workforce. Thus growth rates in di¤erent periods are no longer independent, confuting Gibrat's Law. As explained in Section 4, all of these results support Hypothesis 9: i.e., that the use of dynamic management strategies by …rms can explain the empirical breakdown of Gibrat's Law.
Finally, H10 predicted that adoption of static 'best practice'management strategies would not increase a …rm's growth rate. One simple way of testing this hypothesis is to take the set of variables that were shown to be signi…cant determinants of growth over 1996-2001 period, and to check whether they also explained growth in the earlier 1992-1996 period. If it is found that they do, then one could conclude that a 'static'policy of replicating the strategies and conditions observed to conduce to success in one period (here, 1992-1996) can work in other periods (i.e., until 2001) as well -in contradiction to H10. The results are shown in Table 6 .
[ INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] First, it is clear that the explanatory power of the growth regression is much weaker in Table 6 compared with Table 4 , re ‡ected in the low value of indicating support for H10. In e¤ect, the explanatory power of the management strategy variables is reduced dramatically. The only management strategy variable that appears to be signi…cant is 'Sells to other companies' (corporate strategy) which, unlike in Table 4 , has an insubstantial (near zero) e¤ect. The other signi…cant variable in Table 6 is an external environment one -'Sales risk' (market attractiveness) -implying as before that …rms with wide year-to-year ‡uctuations in their sales growth grow more rapidly than those where the growth is more consistent. Again, the e¤ect is quantitatively much smaller in Table 6 than it is in Table 4 . Taken as a whole, these results are broadly supportive of H10. Only one 'best practice' management strategy variable from the 1996-2001 analysis was associated with rapid growth in the 1992-1996 period. Clearly, the same variables do not appear to exert a consistent in ‡uence in di¤erent time periods. This …nding cautions against using the lessons learnt from one period and applying them without modi…cation in a di¤erent time period.
Of course, the analysis just conducted can be no more than exploratory. After all, much of our data is static in nature, based on a single cross-section derived from a one-o¤ questionnaire; and the above analysis has implicitly assumed that in the …ve-year period after the questionnaire was commissioned, there were no major shifts in strategy, on average. Given the large literature on organisational inertia [see van for a recent overview], this assumption is not unrealistic. As is well known from empirical studies of organisational change, major strategic re-orientations are exceptions rather than the rule, particularly over short time spans [see the review chapters on change in Baum (2002) ]. However, only with a repeatedmeasures research design we can check the validity of our assumption of relative strategic inertia.
Conclusion
This paper has made several contributions to our understanding of the determinants of …rm growth, of the behaviour of gazelles, and of the role of strategic management in a dynamic context. First, we advanced a theoretical framework that emphasised the importance of dynamic, rather than static, management strategies. This was embedded in a joint model of …rm performance, management strategies, and the external environment. This model o¤ers neat ways to test hypotheses in the area of contingency and growth theories. Particularly, it suggests why Gibrat's Law might break down, and how adopting 'best practices'policies may well be counterproductive.
Second, we showed how this theory could explain three empirical …nd-ings, using a novel British data set containing information on over 100 gazelles. These …ndings included (i) why Gibrat's Law of random …rm growth processes does not generally hold, (ii) which strategy and environmental variables have a predictable in ‡uence on …rm performance, and (iii) why routine application of static 'best practice'strategies is unlikely to foster …rm growth in a changing economic environment. Under (i), dynamic management strategies were found to explain persistent growth di¤erences between …rms over time. Under (ii), the key strategies helping gazelles to become or remain large (in terms of turnover) included having both a marketing department and a main product that is a major contributor to sales. Interestingly, large gazelles also avoided both new product development and using customer complaints as a key form of quality control. When measuring organisational performance in terms of growth, successful strategies were found to include using customer surveys, selling to other companies rather than to customers directly, avoiding issuing shares to workers, directors or outside investors, and refraining from developing new products or services. Under (iii), we showed that …rms are unlikely to be successful if they attempt to draw lessons from observing growth in one period and apply them routinely at a di¤erent point in time.
Third, we found that gazelles have di¢ culty sustaining their frenzied pace of growth. Whereas mean annual sales growth between 1992 and 1996 was 36 per cent, this dropped to just 8 per cent between 1996 and 2001. Thus gazelle-like growth behaviour of …rms appears to be fragile, having failed to persist over a decade, even in a period (in the late 1990s) of impressive macroeconomic growth.
It is interesting to speculate why many British gazelles failed to continue growing rapidly. Our empirical …ndings suggest that an inappropriate mix of strategies were mainly to blame. Sustained growth over a long period requires the timely adaptation of strategies, both externally and internally. Apparently, organisational ecology's assumption of organisational inertia [Hannan and Freeman (1984); and Carroll and Hannan (2000) ] does apply to our sample of gazelles. High-growth Middle Market …rms develop routinised strategies, which were reinforced by their early association with rapid growth. To change such routinised strategies after a period of positive performance feedback is anything but easy, as is clear from research into strategic momentum [Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (1993) ; Greve (1999) ]. To the extent that some gazelles adopted inappropriate rules of thumbfor example, by launching worker pro…t-sharing schemes -this bears out our message that such strategies are unlikely to be successful.
An important …nding is that those gazelles which continue to grow rapidly are those which are least likely to sell shares to others -workforce, directors or venture capitalists. Of course, this begs the question about why worker share ownership schemes, for instance, often fail to deliver growth -in contrast to what many regard as the 'received wisdom'. While further research is needed to provide de…nitive answers to this question, one can hazard several guesses. It might be that such schemes involve management losing control, or workers receiving a su¢ ciently large 'income e¤ect' that incentives to supply high e¤ort are blunted. Alternatively, this …nding may imply that the gazelles'owners have specialist inside knowledge of the expected performance of the business. In short, it is because the owners know that the business will succeed that they do not sell to anybody. Only owners that are either more uncertain or know that the business will not perform as well, actually sell their shares. Clearly, these are just tentative suggestions, and further research is needed to consolidate these …ndings in di¤erent industry and country settings.
Other avenues for research remain wide open in this …eld. Rapid-growth Middle Market …rms are a vital element of modern economies, being important 'job-producing machines'. Understanding what drives the sustained growth success of such …rms over many years is therefore essential, not only at the micro level of those …rms themselves but also for the macro level of the economy at large. In particular, what explains our …nding that only a small sub-set of gazelles is successful in jumping over the barriers to sustained growth, while so many other promising Middle Market gazelles are thrown back into a state of low-growth lethargy? To be able to answer this key question, we think that two research avenues are particularly promising. First, a multi-dimensional system-type …t study will be instrumental in …nding out how the many pieces of the performance puzzle work together in producing rapid growth. Second, a truly dynamic study, with repeated measures in a longitudinal context, will open opportunities to unravel the underlying mechanisms of timely adaptation.
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8 Appendix: Proof of dynamism of optimal strategies The proof relies on showing that optimal strategies, S jt , change in response to changes in the environment, e t . To see this, suppose that …rms maximise some objective, which could be a number of di¤erent things, but for which it is su¢ cient to take as pro…ts, t . Pro…ts are given by the di¤erence between turnover, T t , and costs. Suppose without loss of generality that costs are quadratic, given by ( j =2)S 2 jt for strategy j = 1; : : : ; J, where j > 0 are parameters. That is,
Now the …rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort is
The second-order condition is
as is required for a maximum. Now implicitly di¤erentiate the …rst-order condition above to obtain
This is the required result, i.e., that @S jt =@e t 6 = 0. Changes in the environment e t change the optimal (dynamic) strategy, ensuring that ln S jt 6 = ln S jt for all = 1; 2; : : : . Obviously, this argument applies for any and all j. 
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